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12.1    Introduction
The phenomenal growth in Chinese trade with the rest of the world 
since the opening of its markets in the 1980s is well documented. Recent 
attention has begun to examine the sources of such growth, particularly 
the concomitant growth of foreign ﬁ  rm presence in China and their use of 
China as a low- cost export platform. Whalley and Xin (2006) document that 
the foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms’ (FIEs) share of Chinese exports has risen from 
around 10 percent in 1990 to almost 60 percent in 2004 (ﬁ  gure 4). The Chi-
nese experience in this regard is unique in that a substantial portion of FIE 
presence is by investors from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan—regions 
that are considered politically separate to some degree, but are populated 
with ethnic Chinese who have strong connections to mainland China. How-
ever, the share of FIE from other countries is signiﬁ  cant and growing over 
time.
More broadly, the Chinese situation is also unique in its mixture of markets 
and state-  controlled portions of the economy. Openness to market forces 
has been allowed in a stepwise fashion by the government since 1980, with 
successive new policy announcements, presumably informed by prior experi-
ence. With respect to foreign direct investment (FDI), market openness really 
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1. More detailed discussion of these policies and policy changes are discussed by Li and Li 
(1999), Rosen (1999), and Graham (2004).
began with the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong 
and Fujian provinces in 1979 that allowed FIEs for the ﬁ  rst time, charging 
such ﬁ  rms a proﬁ  t tax lower than that applied to domestic ﬁ  rms. Through the 
1980s, the number of these government- policy zones increased substantially, 
and by 1991, many of the restrictions limiting FIEs to SEZs were lifted. 
Nevertheless, there continues to be substantial government oversight with 
respect to FDI in that all new FIE projects require approval from the central 
government and regional governments. In addition, FIEs are often subject 
to performance requirements regarding export percentages, local content, 
and technology transfer. In 1997, the Chinese government published the 
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, which provided 
explicit information on which sectors it encourages, restricts, or prohibits 
FDI. Tax policies toward FIEs has changed over time as well, with initially 
lower tax rates for FIEs to recent elimination of such special treatment in 
accordance with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which speciﬁ  es “national treatment” of tax policies.1
There are a couple features of the Chinese government’s policy objec-
tives toward FIEs that will be important for our analysis and that have 
been deemed important by previous literature as well. The ﬁ  rst is the Chi-
nese government’s concern with the negative competition eﬀects of FIEs on 
state- owned enterprises (SOEs) and its intention to limit domestic access to 
FIEs. The ﬁ  rst SEZs were purposely chosen to be in regions that had little 
industrial (and, hence, SOE presence). Branstetter and Feenstra (2002) use 
provincial data on FIE presence from 1984 through 1995 to estimate that 
the Chinese government’s FIE policies are inherently weighting the welfare 
of the SOEs four to seven times larger than consumer welfare. In addition, 
wholly-  owned FIEs are almost always subject to minimum export targets 
and local content requirements in order to limit their domestic sales but 
keep their domestic purchases high. Nevertheless, the share of SOEs in the 
Chinese economy and its exports have been falling signiﬁ  cantly as the share 
of FIEs and, more recently, private ﬁ  rms has increased.
A second Chinese policy objective with respect to FDI is facilitation of 
technology transfer from FIEs to domestic ﬁ  rms. Technology transfer agree-
ments are often an implicit quid pro quo necessary for approval of an FIE 
project and are explicitly necessary to get approval of an FIE project that 
will also have access to the domestic market (Rosen 1999). The clear intent is 
to improve the Chinese’s own productive capabilities allowing them to fully 
appropriate the proﬁ  ts from their manufactures of technological goods and 
increasing their long- run growth potential. The risk is that such policies are 
discouraging FDI in these sectors and, thus, causing China to miss out on 
the type of technological spillovers that would occur naturally.Please Pass the Catch-Up    4 7 7
2. Schott (forthcoming) points out that the unit values of the Chinese goods in the more 
“advanced” products are much lower than for developed economies.
The evidence on the net eﬀect of such technology transfer policies is far 
from known, with only a bit of evidence to date. For example, the Chinese 
government has required foreign automakers to partner with domestic pro-
ducers, and Shanghai Automotive recently announced plans to start up its 
own factory to produce a luxury sedan based on plans purchased from Rover 
after jointly producing autos in China with General Motors and Volkswagen 
for many years. Whether Shanghai Automotive will be successful in this in-
dependent venture is clearly uncertain. Chen and Swenson (2006) and Hale 
and Long (forthcoming) provide the ﬁ  rst careful evidence on productivity 
spillovers from foreign ﬁ  rms to domestic ones in China. Both ﬁ  nd evidence 
for such spillovers, but for very limited groups of Chinese ﬁ  rms. Chen and 
Swenson (2006) ﬁ  nd evidence for positive own-  industry productivity spill-
overs for private domestic ﬁ  rms in China (which are still a fairly small por-
tion of the Chinese economy), while Hale and Long (forthcoming) ﬁ  nd 
that such spillovers are only positive for the most technologically advanced 
Chinese ﬁ  rms.
The extent to which Chinese ﬁ  rms are able to develop their own productive 
capabilities and transition from state-  controlled ﬁ  rms to private, market-
 oriented  ﬁ  rms is extremely important. Whalley and Xin (2006) undertake 
a growth accounting exercise that ﬁ  nds that while the employment share 
of FIEs is only 3 percent, they account for over 20 percent of the Chinese 
economy and around 40 percent of its recent growth. Their conclusion is 
that the sustainability of China’s export growth and, indeed, its overall gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth is suspect if inward FDI ﬂ  ows plateau. 
This would be especially true if productivity spillovers are limited. This 
point also relates to recent analysis by Rodrik (2006), which shows that 
the composition of Chinese exports is much closer to that of a developed 
economy than other developing economies and that this “advanced” com-
position of China’s export basket is correlated with higher long- run growth 
potential.2 However, the extent to which FIEs are behind such compositional 
diﬀerences, as well as spillover potential, clearly aﬀects this assertion. Wang 
and Wei (chapter 2 in this volume) analyze this further by examining the fac-
tors aﬀecting the evolution of Chinese exports vis- à- vis the rest of the world. 
In contrast, our focus is on the internal comparison of how Chinese ﬁ  rms 
have fared relative to foreign- owned ﬁ  rms, with an eye toward understanding 
how much Chinese ﬁ  rms are “catching up” and the extent to which Chinese 
policies have facilitated a “catch-  up” eﬀect.
In summary, foreign investment and exports by foreign- owned ﬁ  rms have 
become quite important to the Chinese economy. At the same time, the 
Chinese government has been quite active in trying to “manage” foreign 
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so that their own Chinese- owned ﬁ  rms can “catch up” in their technological 
know- how.
This chapter examines these issues by ﬁ  rst presenting a model of potential 
foreign investment into a vertically diﬀerentiated industry, with a foreign 
ﬁ  rm producing a higher quality product than its Chinese rival. The two-
  period model begins with a foreign ﬁ  rm deciding whether to locate produc-
tion into China, knowing that foreign investment into China will lower its 
production costs but may lead to greater technology transfer due to closer 
proximity to the Chinese ﬁ  rm. The model generates a number of predic-
tions for relative market shares and prices (unit values) charged by the two 
ﬁ  rms. We also generate predictions about how Chinese government policies 
toward FDI will aﬀect these patterns as well. We then examine these hypoth-
eses using detailed data on Chinese exports by type of ﬁ  rm (wholly-  owned 
foreign- invested ﬁ  rms, SOEs, joint ventures, etc.) to analyze the evolution of 
Chinese export market shares and unit values over time during our sample 
period of 1997 to 2005.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 12.2 pro-
vides the literature review, while section 12.3 presents a model of foreign 
investment into China. We brieﬂ  y discuss the descriptive analysis of exports 
and unit values over time in section 12.4. Section 12.5 oﬀers the empirical 
analyses, and section 12.6 concludes.
12.2    Literature  Review
A signiﬁ  cant portion of the previous academic literature on export activi-
ties of China and the role of FIEs has concerned itself with ownership issues. 
Feenstra and Hanson (2004) and Feenstra, Hanson, and Lin (2004) examine 
the prominent role of Hong Kong investors as intermediaries in China’s 
trade to the rest of the world. They ﬁ  nd that Hong Kong’s reexports of 
Chinese products involve an average of around 25 percent markups, which 
are even larger for diﬀerentiated products and allow for price discrimina-
tion across diﬀerent destinations. They also develop a discrete choice model 
of the decision whether to use Hong Kong as an intermediary for trade. 
Their empirical analysis based on this model estimates that the beneﬁ  ts of 
using Hong Kong intermediaries are equivalent to 16 percent of the value 
of the product, on average. This is evidence that Hong Kong traders have 
signiﬁ  cant informational advantages over traders and investors from other 
countries.
A related literature has examined the type of FIE chosen by all foreign 
investors in China. Initially, the Chinese government only allowed joint ven-
tures, not wholly- owned FIEs. In addition, exports receive diﬀerent Customs 
treatment depending on whether imported inputs are supplied by the for-
eign party. Feenstra and Hanson (2005) develop a property-  rights model to 
explain when the foreign party will own the plant or make input decisions, Please Pass the Catch-Up    4 7 9
3. Chen and Swenson (2006) also examine productivity spillovers from foreign ﬁ  rms to 
domestic ones in China but use the same data set we examine in this study. While this data set 
is not ﬁ  rm- level data per se, it has trade data by type of ﬁ  rm and city code for later years of the 
sample. Their productivity spillover analysis ﬁ  nds that the export presence of foreign ﬁ  rms in 
the same city and sector is correlated with an increased variety of exported product codes and 
higher unit values for private Chinese ﬁ  rms.
4. They can only examine the foreign ﬁ  rms, as domestic Chinese ﬁ  rms do not report their 
export destinations, which is key for the study to identify ﬁ  rm-  speciﬁ  c exchange rate shocks.
and when such ownership and input decisions will be made by the Chinese 
party. Their model and empirical analysis ﬁ  nds that foreign owners will be 
more likely to cede control over input decisions when the value added in pro-
cessing those inputs is higher (such as for more–technologically advanced 
products) and when contracts are easier to write. A complementary study by 
Feenstra and Spencer (2005) develops a model to understand the economic 
forces that determine whether foreign ﬁ  rms outsource intermediate inputs 
through pure external transactions, through contractual arrangements, or 
through their own foreign aﬃliates. They use data on Chinese export behav-
ior by these various types of arrangements to verify their model’s predictions 
that the variety of exported intermediate inputs from foreign aﬃliates and 
contractual arrangements increases more relative to “ordinary” exports the 
lower the (internal) transport costs within China.
There is a very recent empirical literature that has begun to examine 
export behavior and productivity spillovers using a 2001 World Bank survey 
of 1,500 ﬁ  rms across ﬁ  ve major Chinese cities. Hale and Long (forthcom-
ing) estimate productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic ﬁ  rms in the 
same industry and city using these data and ﬁ  nd evidence for such eﬀects 
only for the most technologically advanced Chinese ﬁ  rms. Further investi-
gation ﬁ  nds that a signiﬁ  cant part of this eﬀect is due to these ﬁ  rms’ higher 
share of managers with foreign-  ﬁ  rm experience, suggesting that spillovers 
are occurring through labor mobility.3 Park et al. (forthcoming) use the 
Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis as a natural experiment to examine whether exporting 
aﬀects productivity of the foreign ﬁ  rms in the sample.4 Variation in export 
destinations and their currency devaluation with the crisis is used to identify 
the eﬀect of exporting experience on ﬁ  rms’ productivity. The study estimates 
that such “learning-  by-  exporting” eﬀects are signiﬁ  cant for ﬁ  rms exporting 
to developed countries but not those exporting via Hong Kong or directly 
to less-  developed countries. A ﬁ  nal paper that uses these World Bank sur-
vey data, and which is perhaps closest in topic to this chapter, is Brambilla 
(forthcoming). This study presents a model that connects experience and 
productivity to ﬁ  rms’ ability to develop new product varieties. She ﬁ  nds that 
foreign ﬁ  rms in the sample introduce about twice as many new varieties as 
domestic ones and, consistent with the model’s predictions, a signiﬁ  cant 
portion of this is due to productivity diﬀerences.
The papers we have surveyed to this point are mainly microeconomic and 
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5. We assume away ﬁ  xed costs of production for convenience.
to document patterns of ﬁ  rm organization and performance for a given 
period of time. A number of papers have taken a broader view of Chinese 
exporting patterns. For our purposes, we focus on Rodrik (2006) and Schott 
(forthcoming). Rodrik (2006) compares the composition of China’s exports 
and ﬁ  nds that it is much closer to that of Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) countries than its level of per capita 
income would suggest. This bodes well for China in that a related paper by 
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) ﬁ  nds a strong correlation between 
the sophistication of a country’s export basket and its economic growth. 
Schott (forthcoming) veriﬁ  es this increasing sophistication of the export 
bundle in terms of the types of products exported by China, but ﬁ  nds that 
its “exports sell at a substantial discount relative to its level of GDP and 
the exports emanating from the OECD.” Neither paper examines the role 
of FIEs in these export patterns. Yet Whalley and Xin’s (2006) analysis sug-
gests that FIEs account for the majority of exports from China and ﬁ  nd 
that overall growth of the Chinese economy is quite dependent on the highly 
productive FIEs in their economy.
12.3      A Model of Foreign Investment into China
In this section, we present a simple model to motivate what one may expect 
to happen to FDI decisions by foreign ﬁ  rms into China, technology transfer 
from foreign ﬁ  rms to Chinese ones, and the ultimate impact on the share of 
Chinese exports by foreign ﬁ  rms.
12.3.1    Producers
We employ a partial equilibrium setup, with one foreign ﬁ  rm and one 
domestic Chinese ﬁ  rm producing a good. For convenience, we assume away 
demand in the Chinese market so that both ﬁ  rms only supply consumers 
in the foreign country. Thus, prior to any FDI decision by the foreign ﬁ  rm, 
the Chinese ﬁ  rm is the sole source of Chinese exports of the good to the 
foreign country.
There is vertical diﬀerentiation of the good supplied by the two ﬁ  rms, 
with the foreign ﬁ  rm producing a higher quality good with quality level 
KF, and the Chinese ﬁ  rm producing with a lower quality level KCH; that is, 
KF   KCH.5 Variable production costs are lower for any ﬁ  rm located in the 
Chinese market, with an assumed zero constant marginal cost of produc-
tion in China and a marginal cost of c   0 in the foreign market. Thus, FDI 
into the Chinese market is attractive to the foreign ﬁ  rm due to the lower 
costs of production. However, we also assume that technology transfer may 
occur between the ﬁ  rms if the foreign ﬁ  rm locates in the Chinese market. 
This technology transfers raises the quality (KCH) of the low- quality Chinese Please Pass the Catch-Up    4 8 1
6. This keeps the model simple but captures the idea that it is easier for technology to transfer 
when ﬁ  rms are geographically closer.
producer, but comes at a cost. For convenience, we assume that technology 
transfer is zero if the foreign ﬁ  rm does not locate production in the Chinese 
market.6 Because of this diﬀerence, the foreign ﬁ  rm has incentives to not 
locate production in the Chinese market, everything else equal.
12.3.2    Consumers
Consumers have identical preferences for goods but vary in their income 
levels. We assume that income levels are distributed uniformly over the unit 
interval, where h indexes the consumer with income of h. Consumers may 
purchase the good from either the foreign or domestic producer or choose 
not to purchase. If they do not purchase the good, they receive a level of 
utility equal to U0h, where U0   0. If they purchase the good from a supplier, 
they receive utility of U(Ki)(h – pi), where p is the price charged by the sup-
plier, and i   CH, F. We make the natural assumption that U(.) is increasing 
in K so that higher quality means higher utility. We also restrict U(K)   U0 
for all K so that all consumers would prefer to purchase a product (regardless 
of its quality) if its price is zero.
With this setup, we can now solve for the demand function for each ﬁ  rm 
in the following way. Given the parameter space we consider (particularly 
our restrictions on marginal cost in the preceding), the high- quality ﬁ  rm will 
always charge a higher price than the low-  quality ﬁ  rm in equilibrium (pF 
  pCH). Thus, demand along the unit interval of consumers can be divided 
into the sections shown in ﬁ  gure 12.1, with the highest-  income consumers 
choosing the high- quality variety and lower- income consumers choosing the 
low-  quality variety or possibly not purchasing the good. This gives us two 
cutoﬀ income levels: hF designates the consumer indiﬀerent to purchasing 
either the high-   or low-  quality variety, while hCH designates the consumer 
indiﬀerent between purchasing the low-  quality variety or not purchasing 
the good. Formally, the following expression of indiﬀerence obtains for the 
consumer at hF:
(1)  U(KF)(hF   pF)   U(KCH)(hF   pCH).
Letting x denote U(KF) and y denote U(KCH), we can easily derive the fol-
lowing expression for hF:
(2)  hF   
(x pF   y pCH)
  
(x   y)
.
In similar fashion, hCH can be solved as:
(3)  hCH   
(y pCH)
 
(y   U0)
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General expressions of demand for each ﬁ  rm are then easily derived as:
(4)  DF (pF, pCH)   1   hF   1   
(x pF   y pCH)
  
(x   y)
,
and
(5)  DCH (pF, pCH)   hF   hCH   
(x pF   y pCH)
  
(x   y)





12.3.3    Timing  of  Decisions
We assume that the foreign ﬁ  rm is initially producing a high- quality vari-
ety in the foreign country with per-  unit costs of c, while the Chinese ﬁ  rm 
is producing a low-  quality variety in the domestic Chinese market with 
per-  unit costs of 0. In period 1, the foreign ﬁ  rm ﬁ  rst decides whether to 
invest into China. If they locate into China, their per-  unit production costs 
are immediately reduced to 0. Then both ﬁ  rms choose their prices simulta-
neously to compete for consumers.
If the foreign ﬁ  rm locates into China in the ﬁ  rst period, then in period 2 
the Chinese ﬁ  rm decides how much to invest in transferring technology from 
the foreign ﬁ  rm. In particular, we assume that the Chinese ﬁ  rm chooses a 
   [0,1] that leaves it with a new quality level KTech   (1 –  ) KCH    KF. The 
Chinese ﬁ  rm may choose to not engage in technology transfer activities (    
0), which would leave it with its original level of quality, KCH. The associated 
level of consumer utility connected with this new level of quality is U(KTech). 
Costs of technology transfer are increasing in  , via a quadratic function, 
CTech( )     2. Once a level of technology transfer is chosen, indexed by  , 
then the ﬁ  rms compete in prices again. If the foreign ﬁ  rm did not locate in 
the foreign market, the ﬁ  rms compete in prices under the same conditions 
as in the ﬁ  rst period with no foreign ﬁ  rm relocation. Proﬁ  ts for each ﬁ  rm 
in each period take the general form of Πi
t(pt
CH, pt
F, KCH, KF,  , c), where t 
denotes the period-  subgame combination.
12.3.4    Solving  for  Equilibrium
We solve for the subgame-  perfect equilibrium of the model in the usual 
fashion by solving backward beginning with period 2 of our model. In 
period 2, there are two possible subgames—one where the foreign ﬁ  rm did 
not locate in China and, thus, technology transfer did not occur (which 
Fig. 12.1    Firm demands and cutoﬀ points along the distribution of consumersPlease Pass the Catch-Up    4 8 3
we denote as 2N) and one where the foreign ﬁ  rm located in China and 
technology transfer has potentially occurred to the Chinese ﬁ  rm (which we 
denote as subgame 2T). In subgame 2N, the foreign ﬁ  rm does not locate 
production into China and continues to have a cost disadvantage (i.e., c   0), 
but no technology transfer occurs (    0). In this case, we denote the respec-








2N, KCH, KF, 0, c)
(7)  ΠF









2N are the optimally chosen prices by the Chinese and foreign 
ﬁ  rm, respectively. These equilibrium prices and proﬁ  ts will be identical to 
those in period 1 when the foreign ﬁ  rm does not relocate to China (denoted 
subgame 1N).
The more interesting and relevant case for our purposes is subgame 2T, 
where the foreign ﬁ  rm has located into China and reduced its production 
costs from c to 0, but the Chinese ﬁ  rm has the ability to increase its quality 
from KCH to KTech through technology transfer. Given costs, qualities, and 
optimally chosen technology transfer, the ﬁ  rms simultaneously choose their 
own price to maximize proﬁ  ts. We denote the respective Nash equilibrium 








2T, KCH, KF,  , c)
(9)  ΠF









2T and are the optimally chosen prices by the Chinese and foreign 
ﬁ  rm, respectively, and   is the optimal degree of technology transfer chosen 
by the Chinese ﬁ  rm. From this, we get Propositions 1a and 1b:
PROPOSITION 1a. The ratio of the foreign ﬁ  rm’s equilibrium price to the 
Chinese ﬁ  rm’s equilibrium price is decreasing in the amount of technology 
transfer. (See appendix for proof.)
PROPOSITION 1b. The ratio of the foreign ﬁ  rm’s market share to the Chinese 
ﬁ  rm’s market share in equilibrium is decreasing in the amount of technology 
transfer. (See appendix for proof.)
The results in propositions 1a and 1b are quite intuitive. It is easy to show 
in the model that a higher quality ﬁ  rm will charge a higher price. Thus, 
as technology transfer leads to the quality of the two ﬁ  rms converging, 
the equilibrium prices charged by the ﬁ  rms also converge. An increase in 
technology also allows the low-  quality ﬁ  rm to “steal” market share away 
from the high-  quality ﬁ  rm even though the high-  quality ﬁ  rm will optimally 
respond by lowering its equilibrium price some.
Now we turn to the Chinese ﬁ  rm’s optimal technology transfer decision as 
represented by their choice of   prior to the market competition in period 2. 484        Bruce A. Blonigen and Alyson C. Ma
The Chinese ﬁ  rm’s problem is to choose   to maximize second-  stage proﬁ  ts 













2T, KCH, KF,  , 0)     2
From this optimization problem, we can derive:
PROPOSITION 2. The level of technology transfer chosen by the Chinese 
ﬁ  rm is decreasing in the cost or diﬃculty of such transfer ( ). (See appendix 
for proof.)
This leads to the following corollaries:
COROLLARY 3a. The greater the cost of technology transfer, the less the 
Chinese ﬁ  rm’s equilibrium price moves closer to the foreign ﬁ  rm’s equilibrium 
price for the case where the foreign ﬁ  rm locates in China. (See appendix for 
proof.)
COROLLARY 3b. The greater the cost of technology transfer, the higher the 
ratio of the foreign ﬁ  rm’s market share to the Chinese ﬁ  rm’s market share in 
equilibrium for the case where the foreign ﬁ  rm locates in China. (See appendix 
for proof.)
Corollaries 3a and 3b are a primary focus for our empirical work in the fol-
lowing, where we examine how the relative prices and export market shares 
of the Chinese and foreign ﬁ  rms evolve after FDI into China. In particular, 
our hypotheses stemming from these corollaries is that factors that make 
technology transfer more costly/diﬃcult mitigates positive spillover eﬀects 
from foreign ﬁ  rm presence to the Chinese ﬁ  rms. In the case of prices, more 
costly or diﬃcult technology transfer means that Chinese ﬁ  rms’ export prices 
do not catch up to foreign ﬁ  rm export prices for the same good very quickly 
or at all. In the case of market shares, more costly or diﬃcult technology 
transfer means that Chinese ﬁ  rms’ relative export market share will increase 
less or even decline with foreign ﬁ  rm presence.
Finally, we solve the ﬁ  rst-  period of the model. If the foreign ﬁ  rm does 
not locate in China (subgame 1N), then equilibrium prices and proﬁ  ts are 
identical to those in subgame 2N described in the preceding. If the foreign 
ﬁ  rm locates in the Chinese market, production costs are lowered, but tech-
nology transfer has not yet occurred. Equilibrium proﬁ  ts in this subgame 








1L, KCH, KF, 0, 0)
(12)  ΠF









1L are the optimally chosen prices by the Chinese and foreign 
ﬁ  rm in this subgame. It’s easy to show the following relationships between 
equilibrium proﬁ  ts for the foreign ﬁ  rm:Please Pass the Catch-Up    4 8 5
(13)  ΠF




2T   ΠF
2N.
This leads us to an analysis of the foreign ﬁ  rm’s initial decision whether to 
engage in FDI by locating in China. Assuming a one- time ﬁ  xed cost of FDI, 
which we denote as F, the foreign ﬁ  rm decides to locate to China if:
(15)  ΠF
1L   ΠF
2T   F   ΠF
1N   ΠF
2N.
This leads to:
PROPOSITION 4. The FDI decision by the foreign ﬁ  rm into China is more 
likely (a) the greater the cost savings, and (b) the greater the cost or diﬃculty 
of technology transfer. (See appendix for proof.)
While our empirical work in the following does not examine data on FDI 
into China, Proposition 4 highlights that FDI is endogenous with the abil-
ity of Chinese ﬁ  rms to transfer technology from the foreign ﬁ  rm. When 
technology transfer is made relatively easy by the FDI, the foreign ﬁ  rm is 
less likely to locate in China. This selection issue suggests that we may only 
observe FDI into industries where technology transfer is diﬃcult or costly. 
Thus, we may ﬁ  nd little evidence of convergence of relative export prices and 
increases in Chinese market share after FDI increases in an industry. Our 
empirical analysis will account for this potential endogeneity bias.
12.3.5      Role of Government Policies
The Chinese government has active policies to encourage or restrict FDI 
into certain industries or products. A simple way to examine the impact of 
these policies in the model is to think of these policies as either lowering or 
raising the ﬁ  xed costs of FDI (F). Encouragement of FDI (lowering of F) 
would obviously lead to the condition in equation (15) being more likely sat-
isﬁ  ed, increasing the probability of FDI. The immediate eﬀect would be to 
increase the foreign ﬁ  rm market share (from zero when no FDI takes place). 
However, the foreign ﬁ  rms that did not engage in FDI in the ﬁ  rst place were 
ones for which technology transfer would be more signiﬁ  cant or production 
cost decreases from locating to China is less signiﬁ  cant. If the encourage-
ment policy selects a foreign ﬁ  rm into China that otherwise would have 
stayed out because of technology transfer concerns, then by Proposition 1a 
and 1b, we may expect the encourage policy to lead to a greater decrease in 
the ratio of foreign-  to-  Chinese market shares and unit values over time.
Of course, all of these eﬀects stemming from a policy of encouraging FDI 
would be the exact opposite with a Chinese government policy of restrict-
ing FDI, if such restrictions simply increase the costs of FDI. However, in 
many cases, Chinese restrictions on FDI involve requiring foreign ﬁ  rms to 
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nent example of this is the automobile industry. This restriction can easily 
be modeled as a lowering of technology transfer costs ( ) in our model, 
which by corollaries 3a and 3b would make the ratio of foreign-  to-  Chinese 
market shares and unit values decrease in the second period, ceteris paribus. 
However, both the higher ﬁ  xed costs of FDI and greater technology transfer 
makes it less likely that the foreign ﬁ  rm would enter.
12.3.6    Ownership  Structure
For simplicity, we do not consider alternative forms of FDI ownership 
structure in our model. However, the data we explore in the following have 
considerable information on the amounts of activity from both joint venture 
and wholly- owned foreign ﬁ  rms. Joint venture activity presumably facilitates 
greater technology transfer (i.e., lower costs of transfer for the Chinese ﬁ  rm). 
A foreign ﬁ  rm could conceivably be interested in pursuing a joint venture, 
nevertheless, if it lowered its ﬁ  xed costs of FDI or provided an even greater 
reduction in production costs. This would lead to a positive selection eﬀect, 
making it more likely that a foreign ﬁ  rm will invest in China despite tech-
nology transfer concerns. Thus, while we have not modeled a foreign ﬁ  rm’s 
decision of ownership structure, this discussion suggests that when a foreign 
ﬁ  rm does choose to engage in a joint venture, we should expect a greater 
decrease in relative foreign-  to-  Chinese market shares and unit values over 
time than in the case where the foreign ﬁ  rm chooses to be an independent, 
wholly-  owned foreign ﬁ  rm.
12.4      A Brief Descriptive Analysis of Exports and Unit Values over Time
Before examining our hypotheses, we brieﬂ  y describe and look at some 
general trends in the primary data set on Chinese exports we use for our 
analysis. These Chinese trade data span the years from 1995 to 2005 and 
were made available through the Customs General Administration of the 
People’s Republic of China, as part of the project described in Feenstra 
et al. (1998). Our data set includes both ordinary and processing trade. An 
important feature of the data is that it disaggregates export trade activity by 
the type of ﬁ  rm, namely, foreign-  invested enterprises (FIEs), state-  owned 
enterprises (SOEs), contractual joint ventures (CJVs), equity joint ventures 
(EJVs), collectively owned enterprises (COEs), and privately owned enter-
prises (POEs). Foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms are ﬁ  rms wholly-  owned by foreign 
funded ﬁ  rms and overseas Chinese companies. State-  owned enterprises are 
the traditional noncorporation economic units, where the entire assets are 
owned by the state. Collectively owned enterprises are collectively owned 
economic units, including township and village ﬁ  rms. Privately owned enter-
prises are economic units owned by private, domestic Chinese individuals. 
Finally, CJVs are joint ventures between Chinese corporations and foreign 
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7. We use the end-  of-  sample 2004 rankings of export shares to determine the top ten sec-
tors.
ments, whereas EJVs are joint ventures where proﬁ  ts and risks are shared in 
accordance with the percentage of shareholdings, and the foreign entity may 
not own more than 50 percent of the venture. These distinctions will allow us 
to understand the various and changing role of foreign and domestic ﬁ  rms 
in Chinese exporting patterns.
Figure 12.2 provides the value of exports over time for the top ten indus-
tries at the two-  digit Harmonized System (HS) level.7 Machinery (HS 84) 
and Electrical Machinery (HS 85) clearly represent the largest exporting 
sectors in China and have been a primary driving force in the growth of 
Chinese exports over this period. These two sectors are followed by the two 
main apparel sectors (HS 61 and 62), the Furniture and Bedding sector (HS 
94) and the Toys and Games sector (HS 95). Figure 12.3 shows the export 
shares of all Chinese exports for years 1995, 2000, and 2005 by ﬁ  rm types. 
Although the share of SOE exports in 1995 is the largest, the value of exports 
by SOE has been signiﬁ  cantly decreasing relative to the other ﬁ  rm types over 
the years. In place of the declining SOE export shares is the rise in exports 
by FIEs, EJVs, COEs, and POEs. Most signiﬁ  cant is the relatively large 
increase in export shares by POEs from 2000 to 2005. For purposes of our 
Fig. 12.2    Chinese exports by top industries at two-  digit HS Level, 1995–2004488        Bruce A. Blonigen and Alyson C. Ma
analysis, we will primarily separate our data into two groups, which we call 
the foreign ﬁ  rms, consisting of the CJVs, EJVs, and FIEs, and the Chinese 
ﬁ  rms, consisting of the COEs, POEs, and SOEs.
12.5    Empirical  Analysis
12.5.1    Speciﬁ  cation
We now turn to a statistical analysis of relative market shares and unit 
values for foreign and Chinese exports from 1997 through 2005. Our focus is 
the changes over time in these relative foreign- to- Chinese measures and how 
various factors, as suggested by our model, aﬀect these dynamic patterns. 
Our estimation strategy is quite simple, with our empirical models speciﬁ  ed 
as the following:
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where FSjt is the foreign ﬁ  rm’s share of Chinese exports for a given six-  digit 
HS (HS6) product code j and year t; UVF
jt and UV jt
CH are Chinese export 
unit values for the foreign and Chinese ﬁ  rms for the HS6 product code j 
Fig. 12.3    Export shares of all Chinese exports, selected yearsPlease Pass the Catch-Up    4 8 9
8. We exclude the ﬁ  rst year (1997) of our year-  dummy variables and sets of year-  dummy 
interactions to avoid perfect multicollinearity with our constant.
and year t, respectively; YDt are year dummy variables; Z j
m are a set of M 
variables representing product attributes or policy variables that are hypoth-
esized to aﬀect technology transfer and market competition between the 
Chinese and foreign ﬁ  rms;  j are the HS6 product ﬁ  xed eﬀects, and εjt is an 
assumed white-  noise random error term.
Given the speciﬁ  cation of the dependent variable in equation (16), the 
coeﬃcients on our year dummies in our “export market share regressions” 
show the percentage point diﬀerence in the foreign market share from our 
base year, 1997.8 For the “unit value diﬀerence regressions” in equation 
(17), the year dummy coeﬃcients capture the percentage diﬀerence from the 
base year, 1997. A key focus is also on the double-  summation term in each 
equation, which represents sets of year-  dummy interactions with our focus 
variables related to our model’s hypotheses. We describe these factors that 
comprise Z j
m next.
Our theoretical model in section 12.3 suggests three types of factors that 
may aﬀect the evolution of our dependent variables: (a) cost of technology 
transfer, (b) government policies, and (c) ownership structure. Measures of 
technology transfer costs are diﬃcult to observe, so we rely on two proxies: 
(a) product diﬀerentiation and (b) research and development (R&D) inten-
sity. Our hypotheses are that sectors with higher R&D intensity and product 
diﬀerentiation will be ones for which technology transfer is more costly for 
the Chinese ﬁ  rm. Thus, by corollaries 3a and 3b, these factors should be 
associated with lower declines in relative foreign-  to-  Chinese market shares 
and unit values. The R&D intensity, deﬁ  ned as the number of R&D scien-
tists and engineers per 1,000 employees in R&D-  performing companies, is 
from the National Science Foundation’s Research and Development in Indus-
try (various years). The identiﬁ  cation of diﬀerentiated goods comes from 
Rauch (1999).
With respect to government policies, we focus on oﬃcial lists from the 
Chinese government indicating in which sectors they are encouraging or 
restricting FDI. Information on industries that the Chinese government 
encourages, restricts, or prohibits comes from the Catalogue for the Guidance 
of Foreign Investment Industries, ﬁ  rst published by the Chinese government 
in 1997 and signiﬁ  cantly updated in 2002. The listed industries and products 
are not identiﬁ  ed with any formal industrial classiﬁ  cation system. We use key 
words in the industry/product description for both the 1997 and 2002 lists to 
search for associated HS codes using the U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion (USITC) tariﬀ database search engine, available at http://dataweb.usitc 
.gov/scripts/tariﬀ2003.asp. As discussed in section 12.3, our model predicts 
that encouragement of FDI will increase the relative foreign ﬁ  rm’s share of 
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in the unit value relative to domestic ﬁ  rms. On the other hand, restrictions 
on FDI should lead to greater decreases in both the foreign ﬁ  rm’s export 
share and relative unit value.
Likewise, as discussed in section 12.3, we would expect to see greater 
decreases in both the foreign ﬁ  rm’s export share and relative unit value 
for joint ventures (where the foreign ﬁ  rm is working in close connection 
with a Chinese partner) than with a wholly-  owned (and independent) FIE. 
Because these are not product-  level attributes or policies, we do not empiri-
cally assess this impact through interactions with year dummies in our full 
sample. Rather, we will address these hypotheses by examining our estimates 
when we reconstruct our dependent variables in terms of only FIE or only 
joint venture transactions, respectively.
Before turning to our results, it is important to note that our hypotheses 
come from a model of one-  time competition between a single foreign ﬁ  rm 
and a single Chinese ﬁ  rm. In reality, of course, there are likely many foreign 
and Chinese ﬁ  rms for even a given HS6 product, and there has been on-
going FDI into China over our sample period. This most obviously aﬀects 
our foreign export share variable, where continual FDI can lead us to see 
increasing foreign export shares, even if signiﬁ  cant technology transfer is 
taking place. Likewise, unit value gaps may increase over time if foreign ﬁ  rms 
are locating ever more sophisticated products into China. Ideally, one would 
like to control for the relative entry rates of domestic and foreign ﬁ  rms by 
HS6 product categories. But no such data exist.
However, there are a number of important points in regard to this issue. 
First, both the ratio of FDI stock in China relative to GDP and the ratio of 
annual net FDI inﬂ  ows to gross domestic capital formation in the Chinese 
economy have been fairly constant since the early 1990s, as shown in ﬁ  gure 
12.4. In fact, both ratios have actually fallen some over our sample period 
from 1997 to 2005. This argues against an upward-  trending bias of for-
eign export share in our sample from greater growth in foreign capital than 
domestic Chinese capital. However, to the extent that one still thinks such 
bias may exist, it only modiﬁ  es our connection to our model’s hypothesis in 
the sense that a factor that would lead to greater declines in foreign market 
share in our pure theoretical model simply translates into smaller increases 
in foreign market share in a world where foreign market shares are gener-
ally increasing over time due to other reasons. Finally, at the end of our 
empirical section, we regress unit value gaps not only on year dummies, but 
also on lagged foreign market share to control for the dynamic changes in 
FDI patterns explicitly and more clearly identify any net technology transfer 
eﬀect.
12.5.2    Base  Results
Columns (1) and (2) of table 12.1 provide our results when we estimate 
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interactions between the year dummies and the set of Z j
m variables, and then 
with these year-  dummy interactions. Likewise, columns (3) and (4) of table 
12.1 provide analogous results for our unit value diﬀerences speciﬁ  cation 
(equation [17]). Statistical signiﬁ  cance of these regressions is generally quite 
good with R2-  statistics over 0.8 in the foreign share equations and over 0.6 
in the unit value diﬀerences equations. Most of the variation in the data is 
explained by the HS6 product ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
Our coeﬃcients on the year dummy variables in columns (1) and (3) of 
table 12.1 show us how our dependent variables are changing, on average, 
across our sample and over time. Surprisingly, these estimates provide evi-
dence that domestic Chinese ﬁ  rms are “falling behind,” rather than “catch-
ing up” to, foreign ﬁ  rms. In our foreign ﬁ  rms’ export share equation (column 
[1]), these estimates suggest that the share of foreign ﬁ  rms responsible for 
Chinese exports has been increasing over our sample for the average HS6 
product. By 2005, the average foreign ﬁ  rm export share in an HS6 product 
climbed 4.9 percentage points from its level in 1997 of 50.6 percent. The 
coeﬃcients on the year dummy terms in the unit value diﬀerence estimates 
(column [3]) also suggest signiﬁ  cant “falling behind” by domestic Chinese 
ﬁ  rms, with unit value diﬀerences 9.5 percent higher at the end of our sample 
in 2005 than the ﬁ  rst year of the sample, 1997. Interestingly, the relative 
diﬀerences in unit values had grown by over 13 percent from 1997 to 2003, 
Fig. 12.4    FDI in China relative to domestic output and capital formation, 
1980–2005
Sources: FDI stock data come from UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, various issues; and 
GDP, net foreign capital inﬂ  ow, and gross ﬁ  xed capital formation data from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.Table 12.1  National annual changes in relative market shares and unit values of 
Chinese exports (1997–2005)
Relative market shares Relative unit values
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
Year 1998 0.012 0.017 0.017 –0.067
(0.009) (0.028) (0.028) (0.076)
Year 1999 0.009 0.026 0.057∗∗∗ –0.041
(0.009) (0.027) (0.023) (0.058)
Year 2000 0.018∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ –0.028
(0.008) (0.023) (0.023) (0.050)
Year 2001 0.027∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ –0.037
(0.008) (0.022) (0.025) (0.050)
Year 2002 0.029∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.008) (0.022) (0.026) (0.054)
Year 2003 0.035∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ –0.063
(0.007) (0.021) (0.025) (0.054)
Year 2004 0.044∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ –0.032
(0.007) (0.021) (0.026) (0.053)
Year 2005 0.049∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.008) (0.022) (0.026) (0.051)
Year 1998 • Diﬀerentiated –0.005 0.044
(0.027) (0.060)
Year 1999 • Diﬀerentiated –0.020 0.076
(0.023) (0.049)
Year 2000 • Diﬀerentiated –0.034 0.102∗∗
(0.022) (0.048)
Year 2001 • Diﬀerentiated –0.037∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.051)
Year 2002 • Diﬀerentiated –0.049∗∗∗ 0.090∗
(0.021) (0.054)
Year 2003 • Diﬀerentiated –0.052∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.054)
Year 2004 • Diﬀerentiated –0.047∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.053)
Year 2005 • Diﬀerentiated –0.048∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.051)
Year 1998 • R&D intensity –0.0003 0.002
(0.0003) (0.001)
Year 1999 • R&D intensity –0.0002 0.001
(0.0004) (0.001)
Year 2000 • R&D intensity –0.0002 0.002∗∗
(0.0002) (0.028)
Year 2001 • R&D intensity –0.0002 0.001
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2002 • R&D intensity –0.0001 0.001
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2003 • R&D intensity 0.00004 0.002∗∗
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2004 • R&D intensity 0.0000003 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2005 • R&D intensity –0.00005 –0.0004
(0.0002) (0.001)Table 12.1  (continued)
Relative market shares Relative unit values
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
Year 1998 • Encouraged FDI 0.033 0.136
(0.024) (0.098)
Year 1999 • Encouraged FDI 0.032 0.124∗∗
(0.026) (0.063)
Year 2000 • Encouraged FDI 0.036∗∗ 0.090
(0.017) (0.061)
Year 2001 • Encouraged FDI 0.031∗∗ 0.057
(0.014) (0.074)
Year 2002 • Encouraged FDI 0.024∗∗ –0.048
(0.011) (0.053)
Year 2003 • Encouraged FDI 0.018∗ 0.040
(0.011) (0.051)
Year 2004 • Encouraged FDI 0.024∗∗ 0.045
(0.010) (0.053)
Year 2005 • Encouraged FDI 0.027∗∗ 0.045
(0.012) (0.051)
Year 1998 • Restricted FDI 0.035∗∗ –0.204∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.071)
Year 1999 • Restricted FDI 0.037∗∗ –0.134∗∗
(0.017) (0.064)
Year 2000 • Restricted FDI 0.019 –0.151∗
(0.013) (0.089)
Year 2001 • Restricted FDI 0.015 –0.106
(0.013) (0.071)
Year 2002 • Restricted FDI 0.004 –0.082
(0.017) (0.056)
Year 2003 • Restricted FDI –0.005 –0.070
(0.016) (0.057)
Year 2004 • Restricted FDI 0.007 –0.037
(0.014) (0.078)
Year 2005 • Restricted FDI 0.002 –0.133∗∗
(0.014) (0.066)
Constant 0.506∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.022)
Province dummies No No No No
HS6 dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 116,854 116,854 86,443 86,443
F- test 10.91 3.11 7.09 3.60
Prob   F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.8382 0.8390 0.6011 0.6069
Root MSE   0.1274   0.1271   0.4069   0.4040
Notes: Weighted by value of total exports in 6- digit Harmonized System (HS6) sector. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Winsorize bottom 5 percent and top 5 percent of sample.
MSE   mean square error.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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but then fell to just 9.5 percent greater than 1997 by 2005. This may be evi-
dence of catching up over the 2003 to 2005 period, but, nevertheless, the 
broad trends suggest Chinese ﬁ  rms losing export share and relative sophis-
tication (i.e., unit values) over the period.
We next turn to examination of estimates connected with our year- dummy 
variable interactions with the set of Zj
m variables, which are connected to our 
model’s hypotheses. These are shown in the speciﬁ  cations in columns (2) and 
(4) of table 12.1. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms show the marginal 
diﬀerence in the yearly eﬀect for the associated Z j
m variable. To get the total 
annual change in the dependent variable for an HS6 product with the asso-
ciated Z j
m attribute, one must add up these marginal diﬀerence coeﬃcients 
from the appropriate interaction terms with the year-  dummy coeﬃcients.
We have two proxies for ease of technology transfer in our set of Zj
k 
variables: product diﬀerentiation and R&D intensity. Our estimates do not 
suggest that higher R&D intensity has any diﬀerential eﬀect on the evolu-
tion of foreign export share or unit value diﬀerences from other products in 
our sample. However, there are signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences between diﬀerentiated 
and undiﬀerentiated products. Consistent with corollary 3b, we ﬁ  nd strong 
evidence that foreign unit values have increased signiﬁ  cantly more over our 
sample for diﬀerentiated goods, where technology transfer is presumed more 
diﬃcult, than undiﬀerentiated ones. The gain in the foreign ﬁ  rms’ unit values 
for diﬀerentiated products has increased more than 10 percentage points over 
the gains shown in undiﬀerentiated products. Thus, Chinese ﬁ  rms appear to 
be falling behind even faster for these products. However, counter to corol-
lary 3a, we actually ﬁ  nd that the foreign ﬁ  rms’ share in Chinese exports 
actually increases less for diﬀerentiated products than for undiﬀerentiated 
products. Thus, the data suggest that Chinese-  owned ﬁ  rms maintain their 
market share of exports as they fall quickly in terms of sophistication (as 
proxied by unit values) relative to the FOEs in diﬀerentiated products.
Our set of Zj
m variables also includes two Chinese government policies 
directed at FDI into various HS products: encouragement and restrictions. 
According to our discussion in section 12.3.5, policies encouraging FDI 
are expected to increase the export share of foreign ﬁ  rms and also make 
catching up by Chinese ﬁ  rms more likely (that is, a decline in the unit value 
diﬀerences). While our estimates show that the export shares of foreign 
ﬁ  rms grow signiﬁ  cantly more over time in our sample for “encouraged” HS6 
products, there are no diﬀerences for these “encouraged” sectors in terms of 
their changes in relative unit values. In other words, it does not lead to greater 
catching up by domestic-  owned Chinese ﬁ  rms. For “restricted” sectors, we 
would expect lower shares of foreign ﬁ  rms in Chinese exports, but greater 
catching up. We ﬁ  nd no statistical eﬀect on the evolution of foreign ﬁ  rms’ 
share of Chinese exports. However, we do ﬁ  nd that unit value diﬀerences 
were signiﬁ  cantly lower for these restricted sectors for a number of years in 
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restrictions on technology sharing for these sectors decreased or became less 
eﬀective over time.
Figure 12.5 through 12.9 provide a visual summary of our coeﬃcient esti-
mates. Figure 12.5 displays the evolution of foreign ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese 
exports and the relative diﬀerence in foreign versus domestic- owned Chinese 
ﬁ  rms’ export unit values based on our estimates for the general sample. Fig-
ures 12.6 through 12.9 show evolution of these same variables for products 
with Z j
m attributes (e.g., diﬀerentiated products in ﬁ  gure 12.6). These come 
from our estimates in columns (2) and (4) of table 12.1.
In summary of these base results, we largely ﬁ  nd no evidence for catching 
up by Chinese ﬁ  rms based on the evolution of unit value diﬀerences and even 
signiﬁ  cant falling behind in the case of diﬀerentiated goods. There is also 
a general increase in foreign ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports over the 1997 
to 2005 period, which is even larger in “encouraged” sectors, but actually 
smaller for diﬀerentiated goods.
12.5.3      Controlling for Potential Cost Diﬀerences—
Provincial- Level  Data
Our theoretical model assumes identical cost conditions for foreign-   and 
domestic- owned ﬁ  rms in China. However, foreign and domestic ﬁ  rms within 
an HS6 product category may be in quite diﬀerent locations, particularly 
because we know that Chinese policy (especially in earlier years) only allowed 
foreign investment in certain regions of China. Thus, one may wonder if our 
results in the preceding are driven by diﬀerences in evolving costs conditions 
Fig.  12.5  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative to 
Chinese- owned  ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: Sample averageFig.  12.6  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative to 
Chinese- owned  ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: Diﬀerentiated Products
Fig.  12.7  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative to 
Chinese- owned  ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: High R&D productsFig.  12.8  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative to 
Chinese- owned  ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: Encouraged products
Fig.  12.9  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative to 
Chinese- owned  ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: Restricted products498        Bruce A. Blonigen and Alyson C. Ma
across the diﬀering locations foreign-   and domestic-  owned ﬁ  rms in China. 
Controlling for such cost diﬀerences is also hopefully helpful in assigning 
any diﬀerences and changes in relative unit values as due to product quality 
or sophistication factors.
To address this, we next disaggregate our sample of observations to the 
level of province-  product-  year observations and reestimate equations (16) 
and (17). This increases our sample size by an order of magnitude. Our 
dependent variables now compare relative export shares and unit values 
for foreign and domestic ﬁ  rms within the same HS and province. We also 
include provincial ﬁ  xed eﬀects, which will control for any other unobserved 
time-  invariant provincial ﬁ  xed eﬀects (such as relatively ﬁ  xed diﬀerences in 
province- speciﬁ  c encouragement of FDI).
Table 12.2 presents our results for this province-  level sample in anal-
ogous fashion to table 12.1. (Figures 12.10 through 12.14 show our the 
eﬀects visually in analogous fashion to ﬁ  gures 12.5 through 12.9.) There is 
much more variance in these data, resulting in lower, but still respectable, 
R2-  statistics (over 0.60 in the foreign export share equations and over 0.30 
in the unit value diﬀerences equations). Surprisingly, we get qualitatively 
identical results to our estimates in the previous section. The share of for-
eign ﬁ  rms in Chinese exports increases signiﬁ  cantly over time, and there 
is no signiﬁ  cant change in relative unit values. As before, foreign ﬁ  rms 
in “encouraged” sectors see even larger-  than-  average increases in export 
shares, while ﬁ  rms in diﬀerentiated product sectors see much smaller 
increases in export shares.
12.5.4    Ownership  Structures
As discussed in section 12.3.6, we expect to ﬁ  nd that the foreign-  ﬁ  rm 
export market share and unit value diﬀerence both decrease for joint ven-
tures relative to FIEs. To examine these hypotheses we reconstruct our 
dependent variables, ﬁ  rst in terms of joint ventures relative to domestic 
Chinese ﬁ  rms, then in terms of FIEs relative to domestic Chinese ﬁ  rms, 
and then we reestimate equations (16) and (17). We estimate these models 
using province-  level data and include province ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Our estimates 
indicate that the share of FIEs in Chinese exports rising quite signiﬁ  cantly 
(over 10 percentage points) over our sample period, while the share of joint 
ventures in Chinese exports does not change over time in any statistically 
signiﬁ  cant manner. This is in line with our hypotheses. With respect to unit 
value diﬀerences, both FIEs and joint ventures export unit values do not 
change over time. Thus, for both types of foreign-  owned ﬁ  rms, there is no 
evidence of catching up by domestic-  owned Chinese ﬁ  rms, even for joint 
ventures where we would most expect to see such eﬀects. We don’t report 
these results here for the sake of space, but they are available from the 
authors upon request.Table 12.2  Provincial annual changes in relative market shares and unit values of 
Chinese exports (1997–2005)
Relative market shares Relative unit values
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
Year 1998 0.012∗ 0.017 0.031 0.014
(0.007) (0.020) (0.021) (0.053)
Year 1999 0.009 0.020 0.069∗∗∗ –0.054
(0.007) (0.019) (0.025) (0.075)
Year 2000 0.018∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.057
(0.007) (0.021) (0.022) (0.058)
Year 2001 0.027∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ –0.023
(0.007) (0.019) (0.020) (0.051)
Year 2002 0.029∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ –0.013
(0.007) (0.017) (0.022) (0.061)
Year 2003 0.035∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.007) (0.017) (0.025) (0.066)
Year 2004 0.044∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.007) (0.017) (0.025) (0.061)
Year 2005 0.049∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ –0.001
(0.006) (0.018) (0.026) (0.061)
Year 1998 • Diﬀerentiated –0.005 –0.017
(0.019) (0.043)
Year 1999 • Diﬀerentiated –0.018 0.013
(0.017) (0.044)
Year 2000 • Diﬀerentiated –0.034∗∗ 0.005
(0.019) (0.046)
Year 2001 • Diﬀerentiated –0.035∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.042)
Year 2002 • Diﬀerentiated –0.046∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.016) (0.050)
Year 2003 • Diﬀerentiated –0.046∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.052)
Year 2004 • Diﬀerentiated –0.039∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.051)
Year 2005 • Diﬀerentiated –0.038∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.048)
Year 1998 • R&D intensity –0.0003 0.001
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 1999 • R&D intensity –0.0002 0.003
(0.0003) (0.002)
Year 2000 • R&D intensity –0.0002 0.001
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2001 • R&D intensity –0.0002 0.001
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2002 • R&D intensity –0.0001 0.002
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2003 • R&D intensity 0.00002 0.001
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 2004 • R&D intensity –0.00002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.001)
(continued)Table 12.2  (continued)
Relative market shares Relative unit values
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
Year 2005 • R&D intensity –0.0001 –0.0002
(0.0002) (0.001)
Year 1998 • Encouraged FDI 0.040∗∗ 0.089
(0.020) (0.065)
Year 1999 • Encouraged FDI 0.036∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.071)
Year 2000 • Encouraged FDI 0.036∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.066)
Year 2001 • Encouraged FDI 0.033∗∗∗ 0.105
(0.014) (0.065)
Year 2002 • Encouraged FDI 0.024∗∗ –0.006
(0.012) (0.051)
Year 2003 • Encouraged FDI 0.021∗∗ 0.073
(0.012) (0.049)
Year 2004 • Encouraged FDI 0.025∗∗∗ –0.0005
(0.011) (0.047)
Year 2005 • Encouraged FDI 0.028∗∗∗ 0.042
(0.012) (0.048)
Year 1998 • Restricted FDI 0.027∗ –0.158∗∗
(0.015) (0.073)
Year 1999 • Restricted FDI 0.032∗∗ –0.116∗∗
(0.015) (0.058)
Year 2000 • Restricted FDI 0.015 –0.185∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.063)
Year 2001 • Restricted FDI 0.007 –0.107
(0.013) (0.068)
Year 2002 • Restricted FDI –0.007 –0.011
(0.018) (0.071)
Year 2003 • Restricted FDI –0.012 –0.170∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.065)
Year 2004 • Restricted FDI –0.0001 0.008
(0.016) (0.077)
Year 2005 • Restricted FDI –0.002 –0.050
(0.018) (0.073)
Constant 0.506∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.138
(0.006) (0.016) (0.017) (0.103)
Province dummies No Yes No Yes
HS6 dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1,125,254 1,125,254 329,231 329,231
F- test 9.93 92.95 10.38 8.41
Prob   F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.6060 0.6510 0.3166 0.3176
Root MSE   0.2292   0.2157   0.5628   0.5584
Notes: See table 12.1.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.Fig.  12.10  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative 
to Chinese-  owned ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: Sample average with provincial-  level data
Fig.  12.11  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative 
to Chinese-  owned ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: Diﬀerentiated products with provincial-  level 
dataFig.  12.12  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative 
to Chinese-  owned ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: High R&D products with provincial-  level data
Fig.  12.13  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative 
to Chinese-  owned ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: Encouraged products with provincial-  level dataPlease Pass the Catch-Up    5 0 3
9. Results in this section are also not reported for sake of brevity but are available from 
authors upon request.
12.5.5    Exploring  Other  Subsamples
We also examined whether evolution of foreign ﬁ  rms’ share of exports or 
relative export unit values varies for some notable subsamples of our data.9 
First, one may suspect that catching-  up eﬀects may diﬀer for exports to 
markets that are industrialized than for developing economies. This may be 
particularly true in that the foreign- owned ﬁ  rms that export to industrialized 
countries from China are likely to be from these same industrialized coun-
tries, and thus more technologically advanced. However, when we sample 
only observations of Chinese exports to the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union (EU), we get qualitatively identical results as those with 
the full sample.
We also estimated separate results for the machinery (HS84) and electrical 
machinery (HS85) sectors because these two sectors are easily the top two in 
terms of Chinese exports—see ﬁ  gure 12.2. Both the electrical and machinery 
sectors yield qualitatively similar results to our full sample, with a couple of 
notable exceptions. First, in the machinery results, restricted sectors show 
foreign ﬁ  rms gaining signiﬁ  cantly more than export share over our sample 
than other HS6 products in the machinery sector and also show some rela-
tively small catching up eﬀects for diﬀerentiated machinery products. In 
contrast, there are fairly large “falling behind” eﬀects for Chinese ﬁ  rms in 
the electrical machinery sectors. These results highlight the potential for 
Fig.  12.14  Foreign  ﬁ  rms’ share of Chinese exports and export unit values relative 
to Chinese-  owned ﬁ  rms, 1997–2005: Restricted products with provincial-  level data504        Bruce A. Blonigen and Alyson C. Ma
10. We do not estimate a similar foreign market share equation due to more serious endogene-
ity concerns adding lagged foreign market share terms in that setting.
11. We also tried putting in separate lags of Fshare going back up to four years but found 
that standard errors for our coeﬃcients were often quite high due to multicollinearity amongst 
the lagged terms.
exploring sectoral heterogeneity in future analyses, though we caution that 
smaller sample sizes certainly lower precision of estimates.
12.5.6      Is Increasing FDI Masking “Catch-  Up” Eﬀects?
As discussed earlier, a potential concern with our estimates is the possi-
bility of increasing FDI activity over time. Obviously an increase of FDI 
into China of export-  oriented foreign ﬁ  rms could be a driving force in the 
increase in foreign ﬁ  rm export market shares, thus masking any catch-  up 
eﬀects. Likewise, if these new foreign ﬁ  rms are locating products in China 
that are increasingly more sophisticated, this could be behind the rising gap 
in foreign- to- Chinese relative unit values as well. As discussed, the aggregate 
trends shown in ﬁ  gure 12.4 argue against this scenario of faster growing 
foreign ﬁ  rm formation or entry. However, in this section, we explore this 
issue in one ﬁ  nal manner. While we do not have data on FDI by industries 
into China over time (much less at the HS6 product level), we can use prior 
foreign market share in an HS6 product as a proxy for previous FDI. Thus, 
we estimate the following speciﬁ  cation:
(18) ln  UVF
jt   ln UVjt
CH        1FSjt    2LagFSjt    j    t   εjt,
where FSjt and LagFSjt are terms that control for current and previous 
(lagged) foreign ﬁ  rms’ export share in a HS6 product, while  j and  t control 
for HS6 product ﬁ  xed eﬀects and year ﬁ  xed eﬀects, respectively.10 There are 
a number of ways in which we could specify the lagged foreign ﬁ  rm export 
share term, but we chose to construct it as a moving average of the previous 
three years of the foreign market share (FSjt) in a given HS6 product j.11 Our 
focus will be on the coeﬃcient estimates for FSjt and LagFSjt in this analysis, 
not those for the year dummies. If foreign ﬁ  rms are continuously bringing 
into China production of evermore- sophisticated products, we would expect 
a positive coeﬃcient on current foreign ﬁ  rm export share (FSjt), but if there 
is catching up by domestic Chinese ﬁ  rms due to technology transfer from 
foreign ﬁ  rms, then we would expect a negative coeﬃcient on prior foreign-
 ﬁ rm export share (LagFSjt).
Column (1) of table 12.3 provides our results from estimating equation 
(18). There is a signiﬁ  cant and large coeﬃcient on current FDI export share, 
suggesting that new FDI brings in more-  sophisticated products for pro-
duction and export from China. There is also a statistically insigniﬁ  cant 
coeﬃcient on lagged FDI export share, which is consistent with our other 
ﬁ  ndings that the Chinese ﬁ  rms are not gaining technology from foreign ﬁ  rms 
and then catching up over time, on average.Please Pass the Catch-Up    5 0 5
In column (2) of table 12.3, we interact our variables proxying for costly 
technology transfer (product diﬀerentiation and R&D intensity) and Chinese 
government policies (encourage and restrict) with our current and lagged 
foreign export share variables. These results show a couple eﬀects of note. 
First, the introduction of increasingly sophisticated products is primarily 
coming in the diﬀerentiated product sectors, as seen by the large positive 
coeﬃcient on current foreign export share interacted with a diﬀerentiated 
Table 12.3  Changes in relative unit values of Chinese exports with lagged foreign market share (2000–2005)
Benchmark Foreign- invested  enterprises Joint ventures
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
FS 0.403∗∗∗ 0.036 0.129∗∗∗ 0.141 0.029 –0.100∗∗
(0.024) (0.075) (0.045) (0.088) (0.045) (0.052)
LagFS –0.060 –0.178 –0.024 –0.112 –0.130∗∗ –0.019





























Constant 0.404∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ –0.552 0.193 0.206∗
(0.082) (0.105) (0.097) (0.108) (0.118) (0.118)
Provincial 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS6 dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of 
observations 198,414 198,414 198,422 198,422 226,466 226,466
F- test 16.29 17.39 7.80 9.16 10.26 9.80
Prob   F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.3682 0.3743 0.3544 0.3640 0.4077 0.4113
Root MSE   0.4807   0.4784   0.4859   0.4823   0.5330   0.5314
Notes: Weighted by value of total exports in a 6-  digit Harmonized System (HS6) sector. Robust standard errors in pa-
rentheses. Winsorize bottom 5 percent and top 5 percent of sample. Lags created using a three-  year moving average.
MSE   mean square error; FS   foreign enterprises’ share of Chinese exports.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.506        Bruce A. Blonigen and Alyson C. Ma
product dummy. On the other hand, the restricted sector shows a large nega-
tive coeﬃcient on current foreign export share, suggesting that the restric-
tions are leading to introduction of much-  less-  sophisticated products in 
these sectors. The eﬀects of lagged foreign export share continue to be sta-
tistically insigniﬁ  cant, indicating no evidence of catching up by Chinese 
ﬁ  rms.
Finally, columns (3) through (6) in table 12.3 show results when we run the 
same speciﬁ  cations deﬁ  ning foreign ﬁ  rms ﬁ  rst as only wholly-  owned FIEs, 
and then as only joint ventures. While again, there is no evidence of catch-
ing up for the FIEs, we estimate a 13 percent catch up in relative unit values 
for Chinese ﬁ  rms from the previous three years of foreign joint venture 
ﬁ  rm export activity. This is consistent with our hypotheses that technology 
transfer to Chinese ﬁ  rms is more likely when partnering with a foreign ﬁ  rm 
in a joint venture than from wholly-  owned FIEs in their own sector.
12.6    Conclusion
Facilitating technology transfer to allow domestic ﬁ  rms to catch up to 
foreign ﬁ  rms invested in their country is an obvious goal of the Chinese 
government in the policies they have regarding FDI. Recent literature has 
documented the high level of sophistication of Chinese exports for a country 
at its general level of development. An important question is whether this 
is simply driven by the foreign ﬁ  rms in China or whether Chinese ﬁ  rms are 
also gaining greater sophistication from this foreign presence. The answer 
to this question has signiﬁ  cant implications for China’s long-  term growth 
potential.
We explore the extent to which Chinese ﬁ  rms may gain sophistication 
relative to foreign ﬁ  rms present in China (i.e., catching up) by ﬁ  rst building 
a model of market competition between foreign and domestic ﬁ  rms where 
products are vertically diﬀerentiated, but Chinese ﬁ  rms can close the quality 
gap in products through technology transfer. We term this eﬀect “catch-
ing up” by the Chinese ﬁ  rms. We then estimate the catching up by Chinese 
ﬁ  rms (and related hypotheses) using detailed Chinese export data that sepa-
rately reports exports from foreign and Chinese ﬁ  rms. The general patterns 
over our time period, 1997 to 2005, run exactly counter to what one would 
expect if Chinese ﬁ  rms were catching up—foreign ﬁ  rm’s share of exports 
by product category and foreign unit values relative to Chinese unit values 
are increasing over time, not decreasing. We see these patterns despite the 
fact that FDI into China as a percent of GDP has not increased since before 
our sample. These results are quite robust to a number of speciﬁ  cations and 
varying samples of our data, though a ﬁ  nal speciﬁ  cation examining how pre-
vious foreign market share aﬀects current unit value gaps ﬁ  nds only modest 
catching up for Chinese domestic ﬁ  rms from joint venture activity.Please Pass the Catch-Up    5 0 7
Appendix
This appendix provides proofs for the results in the propositions and cor-
ollaries presented in the theory section of the paper. Throughout, we sim-
plify notation by letting x denote U(KF), y denote U(KCH), and xTech denote 
U(KTech), recalling that KTech   (1 –  )KCH    KF.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1a. Solving for Nash Equilibrium prices in period 
2 after the foreign ﬁ  rm has located to China and technology transfer has 
taken place (subgame 2T), one can then construct expressions for demands 
for each ﬁ  rm in terms of parameters as:
(A1)  DF
2T   
2(x   xTech)
  





H   
(x   U0)
  
(4x   3U0   xTech)
.
Thus, the ratio of foreign-  to-  Chinese demands is:
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QED
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1b. Solving for Nash equilibrium prices in period 
2 after the foreign ﬁ  rm has located to China and technology transfer has 
taken place (subgame 2T), we obtain:
(A5)  pF
2T   
[2(x   U0)(x   xTech)]
   





H   
[(xTech   U0)(x   xTech)]
   
[xTech(4x   3U0   xTech)]
.
Thus, the ratio of foreign-  to-  Chinese prices is:
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Given the parameter values and assumed relationships presented in the text, 
this is easily signed as negative. QED
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. We assume that optimal second- period prices 
and demands are known functions of parameters for the Chinese ﬁ  rm when 
choosing the optimal  . Then, provided second-  order suﬃcient conditions 
hold for proﬁ  t maximization in equation (10), we can write and sign the 
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QED
PROOF OF COROLLARIES 3a AND 3b. Using notation for relative price and 


























By the relationships established in propositions 1a, 1b, and 2, relative foreign 
demand and unit values are then increasing in  . QED
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. ΠF
1N and ΠF
2N are decreasing in c, while c is a 
nonvarying parameter in ΠF
1L and ΠF
2T. Thus, by the envelope theorem, an 
increase in c (i.e., greater cost savings when the ﬁ  rm locates in China) lowers 
the right-  hand side of equation (9) in the text and makes FDI more likely. 
Likewise, the technology cost variable,  , is only an argument in ΠF
2T on the 
left- hand side of equation (9). By the envelope theorem, ΠF
2T is increasing in 
 , thus making FDI more likely. QED
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Comment  Raymond Robertson
Like many developing countries in the 1990s, China pursued export- led mar-
ket liberalization with the intention of fostering development. China seems 
to stand out in several important dimensions, including the share of exports 
in manufacturing and the kinds of products that China exports. Several 
papers have documented that China’s exports are more on the “high end” of 
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